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THE "DEAD MAN'S STATUTE" IN MISSOURI
At common law all parties to the record' and parties interested
in the event2 were disqualified as witnesses. The foundation for
this extensive disqualification' was the belief that men are gener-
ally so corrupted by their interest that they will perjure them-
selves for it, and, therefore, that their testimony is worthless.
Because of the many resulting hardships, the miscarriages of
justice, and the strong doubt as to the soundness of the principle
behind this rule, the legislatures in almost every jurisdiction
have abolished this general rule,4 retaining, however, a vestige
of this former disqualification in a form of exception. 5
The Missouri statute on this subject is as follows
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any civil
suit or proceeding at law or in equity, by reason of his
interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise,
but such interest may be shown for the purpose of affecting
his credibility: Provided, that in actions where one of the
original parties to the contract or cause of action in issue
and on trial is dead, or is shown to the court to be insane,
the other party to such contract or cause of action shall not
be admitted to testify either in his own favor or in favor of
any party to the action claiming under him, and no party to
such suit or proceeding whose right of action or defense is
derived to him from one who is, or if living would be, sub-
ject to the foregoing disqualification, shall be admitted to
testify in his own favor, except as in this section is provided,
and where an executor or administrator is a party, the other
party shall not be admitted to testify in his own favor, un-
less the contract in issue was originally made with a person
who is living and competent to testify, except as to such acts
and contracts as have been done or made since the probate
of the will or the appointment of the administrator: Pro-
vided fnrther, that in actions for the recovery of any sum
or balance due on account, and when the matter at issue and
1. 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) sec. 329.
2. Id., sec. 386; Note (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 834.
3. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923) 999, sec. 576; Note (1864) 4
Amer. L. Reg. (N. S.) 74, 75; Note (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 834.
4. 1 Wigmore, op. cit., sec. 578; Lampe v. Franklin Amer. Trust Co. (Mo.
1936) 96 S. W. (2d) 710, 714; Signaigo v. Signaigo (Mo. 1918) 205 S. W.
23, 30.
5. IWigmore, op. cit., 1006-1007, sec. 578; Note (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev.
834.
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on trial is proper matter of book account, the party living
may be a witness in his own favor so far as to prove in
whose handwriting his charges are, and when made, and no
farther."
The difficulty in understanding and reconciling many of the
decisions under this statute is quite evident from the following
statements by our courts
The statute has not been construed with any considerable
degree of consistency, nor upon any uniform theory.7
The statute is plain as it reads, but judicial glosses have
made it obscurer than any other on our books.8
Our statute * * * has been prolific of decisions, which we
despair of reconciling. 9
A presentation of some of the specific problems which have arisen
in applying the so-called "Dead Man's Statute" will illustrate this
confusion and shed some light upon the factors responsible for
this condition.
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE-ITS EFFECT ON DECISIONS
The legislative policy behind this enactment is, fundamentally,
that which underlay the common-law rule, namely, to prevent an
interested living party from obtaining undue advantages against
the representatives or successors in interest of the deceased party
to the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial, who is
unable to confront the survivor, or give his version of the affair,
or expose the omissions, mistakes, or falsehoods of such survivor.
The temptation to perjure and conceal when the other party is
dead is considered too great to permit the survivor to testify in
his own behalf. To allow him to testify, it is believed, would
place in great peril the estate of the deceased, and would in fact
make it an easy prey for the dishonest and unscrupulous.10 A
6. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 1734. Prior to 1865 this section simply provided
generally that no one should be excluded as a witness because of his inter-
est in the action. R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 1576. Its main features were added
in 1865 by copying from the laws of Vermont. G. S. 1865, p. 586. The
amendment of 1887, Laws 1887, p. 287, added the provision in regard to
suits by parties claiming under persons who are disqualified from testifying,
and the words "to such contract or cause of action" to the first proviso.
7. Fink v. Hey (1890) 42 Mo. App. 295, 297; see also Dougherty v.
Strong (1926) 313 Mo. 35, 281 S. W. 445, 448; Lieber v. Lieber (1911) 239
Mo. 1, 143 S. W. 458, 465.
8. McMorrow v. Dowell (1905) 116 Mo. App. 289, 90 S. W. 728, 731.
9. Supreme Council Royal Arcanum v. Bevis (1904) 106 Mo. App. 429,
80 S. W. 739, 740.
10. Lieber v. Lieber (1911) 239 Mo. 1, 143 S. W. 458, 461; Scott v.
Burfeind (Mo. App. 1906) 92 S. W. 175, 176; Stone v. Hunt (1893) 114
Mo. 66, 21 S. W. 454, 455.
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second purpose is to place the interested parties to a suit upon
terms of substantial equality in regard to the opportunities of
presenting testimony, by establishing a rule of mutuality, i. e.,
when the lips of one are closed by death, the lips of the other
are silenced by law." And a third function of the statute is to
prevent the delayed assertion and dragging on of claims in the
hope that the other parties thereto will die, in order to secure
the advantage of evidence on one side which can no longer be
challenged by the other.'2
There is a subtle, but nonetheless effective human factor in the
practical application of this statute, and many decisions which
seem logically impossible of reconciliation may be explained by
the fact that the approach in one case differed from that in an-
other.13 Some courts have construed the statute with an eye to
its spirit and purposes. They have felt that to carry the statute
to its literal and logical extreme would turn it into an instru-
ment of injustice, and, consequently, have often admitted or re-
jected testimony in a manner attributable largely to their belief
that the spirit of the statute thereby would be more effectively
satisfied.14 Other judges have realized that the surviving party
in the particular case before them had either a just or an im-
proper claim, and have, therefore, strained both the letter and
the spirit of the statute in order to admit or reject the testimony
as the moral circumstances impelled.15 Still others have felt that
the statute as a whole imposes unjust and undesirable restric-
tions upon the introduction of testimony, and that it should be
abolished or revised. They have, therefore, gradually rendered
these restrictions ineffective by declaring new exceptions, and
11. Scott v. Cowen (1917) 274 Mo. 298, 195 S. W. 732, 735; Hattersley
Brokerage & Comm. Co. v. Hume (1916) 193 Mo. App. 120, 182 S. W. 93,
95; Galvin v. Knights of Father Mathew (1913) 169 Mo. App. 496, 155
S. W. 45, 51.
12. Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, 399;
Crow v. Crow (1907) 124 Mo. App. 120, 100 S. W. 1123, 1125.
13. For an excellent presentation of the importance of this fact see
Judge Lamm's opinion in Bishop v. Brittain Inv. Co. (1910) 229 Mo. 721,
129 S. W. 668, 675.
14. In Stone v. Hunt (1893) 114 Mo. 66, 21 S. W. 454, 455, the court
said, "Accordingly the course of our decisions has been to follow the spirit,
rather than the strict letter of the law." See also Atkinson v. Hardy (1908)
128 Mo. App. 349, 107 S. W. 466, 467.
15. Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, 401.
Our courts generally do not expressly state that they adhere to any par-
ticular theory in deciding the case before them. A study of the decision
reached, the arguments of counsel accepted and rejected, and the tenor of
the opinion, however, immediately informs the reader as to the approach
followed by that court.
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finding new interpretations.' The more recent cases seem to have
stressed this latter construction of the statute.17 Other decisions
have placed a strict interpretation upon the statute, and have
considered the letter and logical sequence as being all-important.18
Considering these conflicting philosophies of judges and the fact
that the statute is very technical and difficult to understand, let
alone apply, it is not surprising that the decisions are conflicting
and frequently impossible of reconciliation.
CONSTRUCTIONS OF STATUTE-BASIS OF DISQUALIFICATION
There have been from time to time three lines of decisions in
this state construing the relationship of the provisos of the
statute to the general enacting clause.'9 One group of decisions
which follow Rood v. Banking House20 have held that the death
of one party to the contract or cause of action in issue and on
trial was the sole basis for the disqualification of the other party
thereto. It was unimportant that the survivor to the contract or
cause of action in issue and on trial lacked an interest in the
suit. In this respect, the statute was disabling as well as enabling,
since a party who had no interest in the litigation, was a com-
petent witness at common law.21 This construction, it seems, not
only greatly limited the competent testimony admissible under
the statute, but imposed a hardship not intended by the framers,
since the primary purpose of this enactment is directed against
the testimony of the interested party, who, supposedly, has an
incentive to be biased and to perjure himself, rather than against
that of a disinterested witness, who, although a survivor to the
16. Id. at 400; see also Chapman v. Dougherty (1885) 87 Mo. 617, and
note the manner in which it overruled Bradley v. West (1878) 68 Mo. 69.
17. For a discussion of this general trend see Freeman v. Berberich
(1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, and Signaigo v. Signaigo (Mo.
1918) 205 S. W. 23.
18. In Poague v. Mallory (1921) 208 Mo. App. 395, 235 S. W. 491, 495,
the court in rejecting a very tenable construction, and in following the
more logical and severe one said: "The answer to this is that we are not
dealing with what is fair, but with the command of a statute." See also
Norwell v. Cooper (1911) 155 Mo. App. 445, 134 S. W. 1095, 1095.
19. Note (1925) 10 ST. Louis LAW REVIEW 101.
20. (1896) 132 Mo. 256, 33 S. W. 816, 817. The important part of the
decision is the determination that where A contracts with B who is the
agent of C, the death of A disqualifies B whether B is interested in the
event or not. The Rood case has been followed in Green v. Ditsch (1898)
143 Mo. 1, 44 S. W. 799; Edmonds v. Scharff (1919) 279 Mo. 78, 213 S. W.
823; Lawhon v. St. Joseph Laboratories (Mo. 1923) 252 S. W. 44.
21. McMorrow v. Dowell (1905) 116 Mo. App. 289, 90 S. W. 728, 732.
"But it is a disabling statute, too, and we think that in providing for the
disability of the survivor of two parties to an agreement the Legislature
was not greatly concerned about whether or not he would have been com-
petent to testify at common law."
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contract or cause of action, has no interest in the suit.22 It was
the interest of the witness and not the survivorship which dis-
qualified the witness at common law, and the statute was passed
to abolish this general disqualification, retaining it, however, in
the instances embodied in the provisos.23
Following a second construction, the Supreme Court in bane
in the recent case of Bernblum v. Travelers Insurance Co. of
Hartford, Conn.,2 ' definitely settled this long controversy by re-
affirming those cases which had overruled the Rood case,2 and
held that the statute is intended to be a qualifying and not a
disqualifying enactment, except where it adds a new specific dis-
qualification of its own.2 6 In permitting an agent to testify, al-
though he was the surviving party to the contract in issue and
on trial, the court said
The result of holding that the original party to the con-
tract, within the meaning of the statute, whose death dis-
qualifies the other party, is the person (contracting agent)
who negotiated the contract, rather than the person in whose
interest it was made, necessarily makes the death of the
agent disqualify the original party, who contracted with him
and who was disqualified at common law because of his in-
terest as a party; but the death of an original party does
not necessarily require the disqualification of the contract-
ing agent (of the other party) who was a competent witness
at common law and is not specifically disqualified by the
statute.
27
Under this ruling, therefore, any witness competent at common
law, remains competent under the statute, with the exception
noted. It follows, therefore, that unless the statute specifically
provides to the contrary, two factors must combine before a wit-
ness is disqualified, namely, he must be the surviving party to
the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial, and he must
have an interest in the event.
22. Supra, note 10.
23. Supra, note 3.
24. (Mo. 1937) 105 S. W. (2d) 941. Here the agent who negotiated the
contract was held competent to testify thereto, although the other party to
the contract was dead.
25. This second construction had been followed in Signaigo v. Signaigo
(Mo. 1918) 205 S. W. 23; Wagner v. Binder (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 1123;
Clark v. Thias (1903) 173 Mo. 628; 74 S. W. 623; Stanton v. Ryan (1867)
41 Mo. 510.
26. The statute expressly provides that a witness cannot testify in favor
of a party claiming under him, although the witness is no longer interested
in the event and would have been competent at common law.
27. Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. (Mo. 1937) 105
S. W. (2d) 941, 945.
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It is possible under this construction, however, for a party to
be both the survivor to the contract or cause of action in issue
and on trial and interested in the suit, and yet be a competent
witness in his own favor. This results from the fact that at com-
mon law there existed certain exceptions to the disqualification-
for-interest rule, and since it is not the purpose of the statute
to disqualify witnesses who were not disqualified before its enact-
ment, except where the statute adds a new specific disqualifica-
tion of its own, these witnesses remain competent under the
statute. These common-law exceptions are the following:28 (1)
interested witnesses were permitted to prove, by their own oath,
their books of original entries, in order to maintain actions of
account or assumpsit;29 (2) a party to the suit who had already
proved that the deceased, against whom the evidence was offered,
had been guilty of some fraud, or other tortious and unwarrant-
able act of intermeddling with the complainant's goods, and no
other evidence could be had of the amount of damages, could
testify to such damages ;3o (3) a witness for the prosecution was
admitted to testify, though he was entitled, upon conviction of
the offender, to a reward from the government, a restoration of
the property claimed as stolen, or a portion of the fine or penalty
inflicted ;31 (4) a party was not deprived of testimony of a wit-
ness whose interest had arisen by his own act, and without the
interference of the party calling him, after the fact happened
concerning which he was called to testify;32 (5) an interested
witness was competent to prove the loss of a written instru-
ment;33 and, (6) interested agents, carriers, brokers, or servants,
when called to prove acts done for their principals in the course
of their employment3 4 This last exception has caused a great
deal of difficulty.35
It is obvious that inasmuch as the statute is now construed
to be an enabling one, in these latter few instances, its principal
28. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., sec. 411; Wagner v. Binder (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W.
1128, 1152-1153.
29. The extent of this exception is stated in Phenix v. Prindle (Conn.
1787) Kirby 207, 207. "Regularly, it goes no farther than to the quantity,
quality, and delivery of the articles charged."
30. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., sec. 348.
31. Id. at 899, see. 412. The basis of this exception is stated to be that
"The public has an interest in the suppression of crime, and the conviction
of criminals."
32. Id., sec. 418.
33. Id., sec. 349; Hamra v. Orten (1921) 208 Mo. App. 36, 233 S. W.
495, 495.
34. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., secs. 416-417.
35. Infra subtopic E. Interest As Agent-Officer Of Corporation-Stock-
holder-Partner.
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purposes will be utterly unaccomplished. The surviving party
to the contract or cause of action in issue who is also interested
in the event in these situations is permitted to present evidence
in his own behalf, often without fear of contradiction or explana-
tion-the very condition which the statute attempts to prevent.
A third construction, seldom followed by our courts, had been
to regard the provisos as exceptions to the general remedial pro-
vision which precedes them. In other words, death was the
underlying reason for the disqualification, but the disqualification
became operative only in the presence of an interest on the part
of the survivor. In this respect, the statute disqualified the sur-
vivor to the contract or cause of action who was interested in the
event, regardless of his competency at common law.3 6 Under this
view, an equitable result seemed attainable, since the survivor
who had no interest remained competent, as he was at common
law, but all surviving parties who had an interest in the suit,
and would, therefore, be calculated to perjure themselves, were
disqualified. This construction, in other words, retained the de-
sirable result reached in the Bernblum case of not disqualifying
disinterested survivors to the contract or cause of action, and
further eliminated the few instances in which an interested sur-
vivor to the contract or cause of action is permitted to testify.
The statute expressly provides two situations in which a wit-
ness is disqualified, although he is not the surviving party to the
contract or cause of action in issue and on trial, and also inter-
ested in the event. They are, first, where the survivor, although
no longer interested in the event, desires to testify "in favor of
any party to the action claiming under him," and, second, a party
to the "suit or proceeding," although not the survivor to the
contract or cause of action in issue and on trial "whose right of
action or defense is derived to him from one who is, or if living
would be, subject to the foregoing disqualification."
NATURE OF DISQUALIFYING INTEREST
A. In General
In determining the nature of the disqualifying interest, our
courts37 have adhered to the common-law test, which is as fol-
lows3s
36. Martin v. Abernathy (1926) 220 Mo. App. 76, 278 S. W. 1050, 1050;
Allen v. Jessup (Mo. 1917) 192 S. W. 720, 723-24; Daniels v. Goeke (Mo.
App. 1915) 176 S. W. 301, 303.
37. Wagner v. Binder (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 1128, 1151, where the com-
mon-law criterion of interest and its application under our statute is clearly
presented.
38. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., sec. 386.
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The disqualifying interest, however, must be some legal,
certain, and immediate interest, however minute, either in
the event of the cause itself,3 9 or in the record as an instru-
ment of evidence, in support of his own claims, in a subse-
quent action.0 It must be a legal interest, as distinguished
from the prejudice or bias, resulting from friendship or
hatred, or from consanguinity, or any other domestic or
social or any official relation, or any other motives by which
men are generally influenced.
A reference to the common-law cases which have presented the
question of whether an interest in the event did or did not exist
supplies one with a voluminous source of authority as to the
nature of the interest necessary to disqualify.41 Liability of the
witness to a like action, or where the witness has a claim arising
out of the same facts to which he is called to testify, does not
disqualify the witness providing the verdict in that suit cannot
be given in evidence for or against him in the subsequent action
to which he is to be a party. Such a witness is interested in the
question only, and not in the event of the cause in issue and on
trial.4 2 Additional typical situations in which the witness was
held not to have such an interest in the event so as to be dis-
qualified are the following: 43 (1) a mother or father in favor of
their children;" (2) children in favor of their parents;45 (3) an
attorney in behalf of his client, although the facts showed con-
clusively that the client's only hope of remunerating the attorney
was to succeed in the action in issue and on trial ;46 (4) the wit-
39. Id. at 883, sec. 390. "That he will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment * * *. It must be a present,
certain and vested interest, and not an interest uncertain, remote, or con-
tingent."
40. Id., sec. 404.
41. Id., secs. 386-406.
42. Thus where A and B each claim separate gifts from the deceased,
A may testify as to the deceased's gift to B, and B may testify as to the
deceased's gift to A, although neither may testify to his own gift from the
deceased. Bank v. Fennewald (Mo. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 207; Townsend
v. Schaden (1918) 275 Mo. 227, 204 S. W. 1076, 1079. The same result is
reached where A and B are plaintiffs in the same action providing their
claims are separate. Allen Estate Ass'n v. Boeke & Son (1923) 300 Mo.
575, 254 S. W. 858.
43. Although the witness may be interested in the event, if he is not
also the survivor to the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial,
he is competent to testify in his own behalf, since the statute is expressly
limited to such survivors.
44. O'Neil v. Stratton (C. C. A. 8, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 911; Curtis v.
Alexander (Mo. 1923) 257 S. W. 432.
45. Anderson, Adm'r of Gentry v. Hance (1871) 49 Mo. 159.
46. Birge v. Rhinhart (1873) 36 Iowa 369, in which the common-law
criterion of interest was followed.
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ness who would avoid the necessity of bringing another suit if
the party for whom he testified succeeded ;47 (5) an heir appar-
ent ;48 (6) where the result of a verdict for demandant in an
action involving a boundary would be to establish that the de-
mandant's patent did not conflict with that of the witness;49 (7)
to testify to a contract of marriage between the witness and the
deceased, in order to establish the plaintiff's legitimacy and right
to take as heir of the deceased, thus practically assuring the
witness of dower rights in the estate;5O (8) an attorney for his
client, although the fee was contingent upon the successful ter-
mination of the particular litigation ;51 and, (9) to testify to the
parol dedication of land by the deceased to the city, where the
witness owned the adjoining property and was interested in
having the street remain a public thoroughfare, so that the
market value of his property would not decrease.52
These cases illustrate that the test of the interest necessary
to disqualify is merely a rule of thumb, rather than one based on
whether the witness is actually interested. The fact that the
witness will positively be enriched or benefited is not always
sufficient to exclude him. It must appear that such enrichment
or benefit will result from an interest in the event.
If a witness was equally interested in both sides, he was not
incompetent at common law; yet if there was a certain excess
of interest on one side, he was incompetent to testify for that
party; for he was interested to the amount of the excess, in pro-
curing a verdict for the party in whose favor his interest pre-
ponderated.53 Inasmuch as our statute is an enabling one, and
our courts follow the common-law standard of the interest neces-
sary to disqualify, these rules would probably be followed by
our courts.
The interest necessary to disqualify must exist at the date of
the trial, and it is immaterial that a witness may have been inter-
ested and incompetent at some time previous thereto.54 Thus an
interested disqualified witness may be rendered competent by a
release of his interest in the event prior to the time of suit.55 A
47. Franklin v. Kidd (1916) 219 N. Y. 409, 114 N. E. 839, 840.
48. Tucker v. Gentry (1902) 93 Mo. App. 655, 67 S. W. 723.
49. Masters v. Varners Ex'rs (Va. 1848) 5 Gratt 168.
50. McCullough v. McCullough (1860) 31 Mo. 226, 229.
51. Mott v. Bernard (1902) 97 Mo. App. 265, 70 S. W. 1093.
52. City of Puxico v. Harbin (Mo. App. 1923) 252 S. W. 393, 394.
53. 1 Grenleaf, op. cit., sec. 420.
54. See Fink v. Hey (1890) 42 Mo. App. 295, 297, for an excellent
presentation of the operation of this rule.
55. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., 426, sec. 419; Hogg v. Breckenridge (1849) 12
Mo. 369.
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witness, however, remains incompetent if he is testifying in favor
of a party "claiming under him," although he lacks an interest
in the event at the time of the suit, since the statute expressly
so provides.
In the following situations the witness has been held to be
interested in the event: (1) liability over, e. g., for bail or surety.
It is sufficient that the witness is bound to indemnify the party
calling him against the consequence of some fact essential to the
judgment. It is not necessary that there should be an engage-
ment to indemnify him generally against the judgment itself ;56
(2) heirs at law of a deceased party;" (3) a party having an
equitable interest in the subject matter in issue and on trial ;8
(4) distributees of an estate ;9 and, (5) where the witness had
a contract with the plaintiff to receive half of the profits of the
plaintiff's contract with the deceased. 0
B. Liability For Costs, Trustee, Guardian Ad Litem, etc.
The common-law rule excluding parties from being witnesses
applied to all cases where the party had any interest in the event,
even though it was only a liability for costs.61 "Such was the
case of a prochein ami, a guardian, an executor or administrator,
and so also of trustees and the officers of corporation, whether
public or private, wherever they are liable in the first instance
for the costs, though they may have a remedy for reimbursement
out of the public or trust funds. ' 62 This rule had been held ap-
plicable also to actions in equity, although costs were discretion-
ary. 3 Although this point has not been directly ruled upon in
Missouri, 64 other jurisdictions which adhere to the common-law
test of the interest necessary to disqualify, have uniformly held
such a party to be incompetent, 5 and there is little doubt but that
our courts would reach the same conclusion, since we unswerv-
56. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., sec. 397.
57. Graves v. Ravenscraft, Adm'r v. Priest (1822) 1 Mo. 214.
58. Fink v. Hey (1890) 42 Mo. App. 295, 298-299.
59. Hyde v. Honiter (Mo. App. 1903) 158 S. W. 83.
60. McClure v. Clements (1911) 161 Mo. App. 23, 143 S. W. 82.
61. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., secs. 401-402.
62. Id., secs. 347, 401 and 402.
63. Id., sec. 402.
64. In McCullough v. McCullough (1860) 31 Mo. 226, 229, the bene-
ficiary rather than the trustee brought the action, and the court held the
trustee competent as a witness on the basis that since he was not liable for
costs he was not interested in the event. This suggests a means of render-
ing the trustee competent in behalf of his trust estate.
65. Comment (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 739, 740; Crocker v. New York
Trust Co. (1927) 245 N. Y. 17; Smith v. Perry (1897) 52 Neb. 738, 73
N. W. 282.
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ingly follow the common-law criterion of interest.6 Thus we find
that witnesses, who actually have nothing to lose, are disqualified
on the basis of their interest in the event, whereas witnesses who
actually have everything to gain are competent because they lack
an interest in the event.
A "nominal" or "unnecessary party" to a suit who is not liable
for costs is not incompetent, since, in any event, he stands to
gain or lose nothing by the judgment, and, therefore, is not inter-
ested in the event.67
C. Interest Must Be Adverse
The surviving party to the contract or cause of action in issue
and on trial has been held competent to testify against his inter-
est,68 or where his interest with the deceased was of a "joint or
mutual nature."69
D. Husband And Wife
Since the 1921 enactment, a husband and wife have been com-
petent witnesses for or against each other in all civil cases, ex-
cept as to confidential communications." The test of their com-
petency in behalf of each other under the "Dead Man's Statute,"
therefore, is the same as applies to the ordinary witness, with
the exception noted. The difficulty arises, however, in determin-
ing whether one has an interest in the event when the other is
a party to the suit.
In an action involving personalty, either spouse is competent
to testify in behalf of the others, since a judgment for or against
the one is not directly or by its immediate effect of any benefit
or detriment to the other.7 1 Where a husband sues to secure or
retain the possession of land, however, the wife has a substantial
interest in the case itself to the extent of her vested marital
rights in said land.72 There is authority in other jurisdictions
for the proposition that the wife's inchoate estate of dower which
66. If, however, the trustee is indemnified against all possible costs, he
is no longer interested in the event, and is competent as in other instances
where the witness is released of his interest. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., sec. 401,
and sec. 347 fn. 2; supra, note 55.
67. Nordquist v. Nordquist (1929) 321 Mo. 1244, 14 S. W. (2d) 583,
588; Paris v. Erisman (Mo. 1927) 300 S. W. 487, 489.
68. Dougherty v. Strong (1926) 313 Mo. 35, 281 S. W. 445, 448.
69. Milligan v. Milligan Grocer Co. (1921) 207 Mo. App. 473, 233 S. W.
506, 509, where the surviving directors were held competent to testify to
the transaction with the deceased director on the basis that directors are
charged "jointly and mutually, and not adversely."
70. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 1728. Laws 1921, p. 392.
71. Ragsdale v. Achuff (1930) 324 Mo. 1159, 27 S. W. (2d) 6.
72. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 318.
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would accrue should the husband succeed in the action instituted
is an interest in the event so as to disqualify her . 7  Missouri
courts, however, adhere to the general rule which does not dis-
qualify the wife in favor of her husband on the basis that her
marital rights may be eventually gained or lost by such suit, be-
cause the judgment does not, by its own terms, bind her to recog-
nize or give up such rights, and therefore, according to the com-
mon-law definition, she has merely an interest in the question,
rather than an interest in the event.7 4 Practically, however, the
possibility of an independent suit by the wife to regain such
marital rights when the husband has lost in the first action is,
to say the least, very remote. The wife, it seems, is vitally inter-
ested and affected by the litigation in issue and on trial, since
she has a vested interest in his realty which cannot be defeated
unless she joins in the conveyance. In a suit by the wife involv-
ing realty, the husband may testify in her behalf, since his
marital rights do not constitute an interest in the event.71 His
marital rights, however, are contingent, and may be defeated by
the wife's conveyance prior to her death without his consent, and
therefore his interest in the suit is rather remote.7 6
E. Interest As Agent-Officer Of Corporation-
StocA holder-Partner
It is generally stated that interested agents, carriers, factors,
brokers and servants were not incompetent at common law to
testify in actions to which their respective principals were parties
where no question of exceeding their powers was involved.7 This
rule was based upon "public convenience and necessity. 78 Where
the principal called his own servant or agent to prove an injury
to his property, while in the care and custody of the servant or
agent, however, the agent was held incompetent at common law,
because of his interest. A verdict favorable to the principal would
73. Wylie v. Charlton (1895) 43 Neb. 840, 62 N. W. 220.
74. In Martin v. Abernathy (1926) 220 Mo. App. 76, 278 S. W. 1050,
1051, the court said, "As to her interest, the only possible interest she could
have had in the outcome of the trial was the interest she might have had
because of the marital relationship. While that interest would possibly
affect her credibility as a witness, it is not such an interest as would make
her incompetent to testify." See also Hughes v. Renshaw (1926) 314 Mo.
95, 282 S. W. 1014; Laska v. Kripteck (1933) 261 N. Y. 126, 184 N. E.
722, 734.
75. Hughes v. Renshaw (1926) 314 Mo. 95, 282 S. W. 1014 (Deed to co-
grantees. On death of grantor, wife of one co-grantee held competent, and
husband of other co-grantee also held competent).
76. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 319.
77. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., secs. 411, 416, and 417.
78. Ibid.
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place the servant or agent in a state of security against any
action which otherwise, the principal might bring against him;
and to the extent of preventing this eventuality, the agent is
directly interested in fixing the liability on the other party.79 A
release by the principal of the agent's possible liability, therefore,
rendered the agent competent. 0 A possible reconciliation of these
two common-law rules8' lies in the fact that in those cases where
the interested agent had been held competent, his interest, gen-
erally, was in the question involved rather than in the event, and
therefore there existed no basis for disqualifying him, nor any
true exception to the common-law disqualification for interest
rule in the case of an agent actually interested in the event.82
Since our statute is now construed as an enabling one, the
agent interested in the event, being competent at common law,
should remain competent under our statute although he is also
the survivor to the contract or cause of action in issue and on
trial, and generally our courts have so held. 3 Some courts, how-
ever, have realized the great injustice which would result in
allowing an interested surviving agent unrestricted power to
testify concerning the contract or cause of action, and, although
admitting the statute to be an enabling one, have ruled the inter-
ested surviving agent to the contract in issue and on trial incom-
petent on the following basis
* * * the agent may testify if the latter's interest extends no
further than his relationship to his principal: but if it ap-
pears, in addition, that there exists a present, actual, and
vested interest in the matter by the agent, he becomes a
principal so far as concerns his right to testify.84
Where the agent of the deceased is also one of the adverse con-
tracting parties, he occupies a double status. His position as
agent has been here disregarded, and he has been disqualified as
79. Id., sec. 396.
80. Id., secs. 419 and 426.
81. This conflict is recognized by Mr. Greenleaf. Id., 888-889, sec. 396.
82. A study of the factual configurations of the common-law cases which
have dealt with the competency of an agent or servant to testify seem to
lead to this conclusion.
83. Wagner v. Binder (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 1128, 1152-1153, recognizes
as a general principle the right of an interested surviving agent to testify.
See also Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. (Mo. 1937)
105 S. W. (2d) 941, 945; Bates v. Forcht (1886) 89 Mo. 121, 1 S. W. 120.
84. Allen v. Jessup (Mo. 1917) 192 S. W. 720, 723 (italics supplied). The
husband acted as agent for the wife. The court admitted that the husband,
since he was an agent, would have been competent to testify to his dealings
with the deceased if he had not also been interested in the event.
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being the surviving interested party to the contract or cause of
action in issue and on trial.85
Where a partner enters into a contract or transaction in behalf
of the partnership, he is incompetent on the death of the other
party thereto, since he is actually an interested principal rather
than an interested agent to the contract in issue and on trial. 0
An officer of a corporation has no interest in the event in a
suit by the corporation, and is, therefore, competent in such
action.87
Shareholders acting as agents for the corporation have been
held competent on the theory that although they are interested
in the event, being agents, they were competent at common law
whether interested or not, and our statute retains this com-
petency. 8 Some decisions have also held that the shareholders
are not interested in the event on the basis that they are not the
persons for whose immediate benefit the suit is brought, but are
separate and distinct from the corporation asserting the claim.89
WHO IS A "PARTY TO THE CONTRACT OR CAUSE OF ACTION
IN ISSUE AND ON TRIAL"?
Our courts have generally held that the parties to the contract
in issue and on trial are those who negotiate it rather than
the persons in whose name and interest it is made. 0 "Literally,"
however, the parties liable on the contract, are the real parties
thereto, rather than the negotiators,9' but to so hold would render
the statute extremely undesirable . 2 A mere "bystander," who is
85. Scott v. Cowen (1917) 274 Mo. 298, 195 S. W. 732 (witness was one
of the makers of the note as well as agent for the deceased payee); Lyngar
v. Shafer (Mo. App. 1907) 102 S. W. 630.
86. Robertson Bros. v. Garrison Estate (Mo. App. 1929) 21 S. IV. (2d)
202, 203; Green Real Estate Co. v. St. Louis Mutual House Bldg. Co. (1906)
196 Mo. 358, 93 S. W. 1111.
87. Old Bank of Stoutsville v. Curtiss (Mo. App. 1924) 260 S. W. 812,
815; Kuhn v. Germania Life Ins. Co. (1897) 71 Mo. App. 305.
88. Bates v. Forcht (1886) 89 Mo. 121, 1 S. W. 120; Kuhn v. Germania
Life Ins. Co. (1897) 71 Mo. App. 305.
89. Old Bank of Stoutsville v. Curtiss (Mo. App. 1924) 260 S. W. 812;
Barclay v. Globe Mutual Ins. Co. (1858) 26 Mo. 490, 491.
90. Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn. (Mo. 1937) 105
S. W. (2d) 941, 945; Clark v. Thias (1903) 173 Mo. 628, 74 S. W. 623;
Note (1925) 10 ST. LOUIS LAW REviEw 101.
91. This proposition was advanced by Commissioner Hyde in Freeman
v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, 400.
92. The death of the principal -would disqualify the party contracting
with the agent, although the agent was alive. The death of the contracting
agent would not disqualify the other party to the contract, providing the
principal was alive. Neither of these results seem desirable if the purposes
of the statute are to be accomplished.
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present when the contract is entered into, is not considered to be
a party thereto 3
When, therefore, the party contracting with the agent dies the
latter is competent to testify concerning the contract although
he is the other party thereto :94 if such agent is not interested in
the event, on the basis that he was competent at common law, and
our statute does not disqualify him ;95 if interested in the event,
on the same basis, providing the court concedes that an interested
agent was competent at common law. 6 Under Rood v. Banking
House 97 which held that death alone was sufficient to disqualify
the survivor to the contract, the agent, upon the death of the
other party to the contract, was incompetent whether he was
interested in the event or not.98 The view which construed the
provisos as relating only to interested survivors, disqualified the
interested agent, but not one who possessed no interest in the
event. 9
Some cases indicate that the agent is not the other party to
the contract in issue and on trial. 09 This dictm, it seems, should
not be considered too seriously, because these same cases clearly
and expressly base the agent's competency on the fact that he
was competent at common law, and therefore remains competent
under the statute which is an enabling one.' 0 ' Since the statute
applies only to the other party to the contract in issue and on
trial, if these cases had not considered the agent to be the other
party to the contract, that fact alone would have rendered him
competent, regardless of his competency at common law. Con-
clusive proof that the agent who negotiates the contract is con-
sidered to be a party thereto is the fact that the death of the
agent has unanimously been held to disqualify the interested
other party to the contract upon the basis that the agent, the
93. Yawitz v. Laughlins' Estate (Mo. App. 1934) 68 S. W. (2d) 830,
831 (witnesses also held not to be interested in the event, and competent
to testify on that basis alone); Hattersley Brokerage & Comm. Co. v. Hume
(1916) 193 Mo. App. 120, 182 S. W. 93, 95.
94. Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn. (Mo. 1937) 105
S. W. (2d) 941; Wagner v. Binder (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 1128; Clark v.
Thias (1903) 173 Mo. 628, 74 S. W. 623.
95. Supra, notes 24 and 25.
96. Supra, notes 77 and 83.
97. (1896) 132 Mo. 256, 38 S. W. 816, 817.
98. Supra, notes 20 and 21.
99. Supra, note 36.
100. Wagner v. Binder (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 1128, 1154.
101. Id. at 1152-1154, where the court discusses the competency of the
agent at common law whether he was interested in the event or not, and
concludes that since the statute is an enabling one such agents are now
competent because they are not expressly disqualified by the statute.
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"other party" to the contract in issue and on trial, is dead.102
Furthermore, the death of the principal does not disqualify the
party contracting with the agent, since the other party to the
contract, the agent, is alive.' 03
The term "cause of action" has not been uniformly defined.10'
Some jurisdictions treat it as identical with another term, "right
of action," referring to the legal right which the plaintiff seeks
to enforce in the action.' 0° "Cause of action" has also been inter-
preted as the "aggregate of operative facts" which give rise to
the plaintiff's right to legal redress. 06 In Freeman v. Berberich'0 7
the Supreme Court of Missouri overruled Leve v. Southern Ry.
Co.,108 and held that the party to the cause of action in suits
ex delicto for personal injuries is the master, rather than the
servant who was acting in his behalf. The death of the servant,
therefore, was held not to disqualify the surviving interested
party to the accident. This decision is sustainable upon the
former definition of "cause of action." The latter meaning, how-
ever, would lead to a contrary conclusion, since the master is
not a party to these facts, but is merely responsible for their
creation. The court, in addition, based its conclusion upon the
following practical grounds
We do not, however, think there is any reason to justify
its application to actions ex delicto for personal injuries,
except as to the actual parties to the cause of action in issue
and on trial. While it may logically be said that a deceased
102. In Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn. (Mo. 1937)
105 S. W. (2d) 941, 945, these cases are collected; Williams v. Edwards
(1888) 94 Mo. 447, 7 S. W. 429.
103. Jackson v. Smith (Mo. App. 1909) 118 S. W. 659; Reed v. Crissey(1895) 63 Mo. App. 184, 190.
104. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) sec. 19; Wheaton, The Code "Cause of
Action": Its Definition (1936) 22 Cornell L. Rev. 1.
105. Clark, op. cit., 78-79, sec. 19.
106. Id. at 83-87. This view is favored by Professor Clark. Professor
Wheaton states that the cases do not support this definition of the cause of
action. Supra, note 104.
107. (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, aff. Drew v. Wabash Ry.(1908) 129 Mo. App. 459, 107 S. W. 478. Plaintiff collided with B, the
agent of the defendant. Although B was dead, the plaintiff was permitted
to testify concerning the accident. The court could have based the plaintiff's
competency on the fact that a co-defendant was alive and testifying, but
it chose instead to expressly overrule the Leavea case and affirm the Drew
decision.
108. (1915) 216 Mo. 151, 181 S. W. 7, followed in Brunk v. Met. St. Ry.(1918) 98 Mo. App. 243, 200 S. W. 443. In a Comment (1915) 11 Mo. Law
Bull. 60, Commissioner Hyde, then a student at Missouri University, criti-
cized the Leavea case which had in that year overruled the Drew decision.
Eighteen years later he wrote the opinion in the Berberich case which over-
ruled the Leavea case.
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contracting agent was in a sense a party to the contract in
issue, it cannot by any stretch of language or reasoning be
logically said that a deceased wrongdoing servant was one
of the original parties to the cause of action on trial. This
follows also from the very nature of the different relations
of principal and agent. Agency contemplates contractual
liability arising from the acts of the agent * * *, whereas tort
liability is properly described by the phrase respondeat su-
perior. The essential distinction is that the agent is em-
ployed to establish contractual relations between his prin-
cipal and third persons, while the servant is not. Rather,
the servant deals with things; if he deals with persons it is
not to bring about contractual relations. Moreover, it is ap-
parent that the duties of a contracting agent to bring about
contractual relations necessarily involves secrecy, and that,
therefore no one, except he who conducts the negotiations,
will usually be in a position to know anything about the
transaction. These matters are not proclaimed from the
housetops nor through the streets. To let others know they
were given in progress would often defeat their purpose.
In the case of an alleged verbal contract, there is nothing
visible which will contradict or corroborate. On the other
hand, the negligent or wrongful acts of a servant in the
scope of his employment, for which a master may be re-
sponsible for personal injuries occasioned to a third party,
are usually open for all the world to see. 10 9
This distinction between contract and tort situations, it seems,
may often exist. The result of the Berberich case, however, fails
to cover a great number of non-contractual situations where
there are no witnesses to the transaction to testify in behalf of
the master, and the survivor, on the death of the servant, sues
the master and presents his own interested version of the occur-
rence without contradiction, explanation, or qualification.' 1 0 The
disqualification of such a witness was the essential purpose for
the enactment of the statute."'
If the Supreme Court of Missouri is to follow the principle of
the Berberich case as to parties to the cause of action, does it
intend to hold that the death of the defendant master, who was
held to be a party to the cause of action, shall disqualify the
interested injured plaintiff, the other party to such cause of
action, although the servant of the deceased defendant responsi-
109. Freeman v. Berherich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, 401.
110. This situation arises under the direct holding of the Berberich case
where the plaintiff on the death of the agent is permitted to testify con-
cerning the facts pertaining to the accident.
111. Supra, notes 10, 11 and 12.
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ble for the accident is alive and testifying for the defendant's
estate?12 It is obvious that the deceased defendant has no knowl-
edge of how the accident occurred, and that his servant would
be present to explain, qualify, or contradict the testimony of the
plaintiff in the event he were permitted to testify. To disqualify
such a plaintiff would not only be unjust, but would be contrary
to every purpose of the statute.
Practically all other jurisdictions reach a conclusion contrary
to the Berberich case,118 on the ground that their statutes pro-
vide that the death of one party to the contract or transaction
disqualifies the other party thereto.2 4 Such a change in our
statute would seem desirable, since it is the parties to the trans-
action who possess the knowledge of the facts in issue and on
trial, which the statute attempts to govern, rather than the per-
sons who may be plaintiff or defendant in the suit.
The servant, upon the death of the other party to the trans-
action, would be competent to testify thereto, since the Berberich
case holds that the agent is not the other party to the cause of
action in issue and on trial, and he is, therefore, not within the
express prohibition of the statute."5 Even if the servant were
held to be the other party to the cause of action, he would be
competent, whether interested or not, on the basis that servants
and agents were competent witnesses at common law, and our
statute has not expressly disqualified them." 6
"CONTRACT OR CAUSE OF ACTION"--WHEN "IN ISSUE
AND ON TRIAL"
In Bradley v. West"'1 the plaintiff brought an action in eject-
ment, relying upon a deed from the deceased. The defendant
based his claim upon adverse possession, and denied that the
deceased had executed or delivered said deed to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff was held competent to prove these facts, the court say-
ing
112. The Illinois statute expressly provides that if the agent to the con-
tract or transaction is alive, the death of the principal does not disqualify
the other party to such contract or transaction. Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stats.
(1935) ch. 51, sec. 2.
113. Reinhart v. Echave (1920) 43 Nev. 323, 185 Pac. 1070; DeNottbeck
v. Chapman (1919) 93 Vt. 378, 108 Atl. 338.
114. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923) sec. 578; Covick, 1 Gen. Stat.
of Kansas (1935) c. 60-2804.
115. Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393.
116. If the servant is not interested in the event, supra, notes 24, 25, 94
and 95. If the servant is interested in the event, supra, notes 28, 83 and 96.
But if the view adopted in 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., sec. 396, supra, note 79 is
followed, the interested servant would be disqualified.
117. (1878) 68 Mo. 69.
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The deed from the grantor to plaintiff was not the con-
tract or cause of action in issue and on trial. The cause of
action in issue and on trial was the alleged unlawful with-
holding, by the defendant, of the possession of certain lands
from plaintiff, and both of the parties to the controversy
are alive. By the words contract or cause of action in issue
and on trial * * * intended such contract or cause of action as
was to be enforced by the proceeding; that in regard to
which an issue was to be formed and a trial had, where the
rights of the parties to the contract or cause of action will
be determined by the result. 18
It may be said that the court reached a logical, although not a
just, conclusion. It was in no way passing judgment on the
deed between plaintiff and deceased so as to bind the latter's
estate. That instrument, therefore, was not in issue and on trial,
but was involved in what was merely a collateral issue. Further-
more, in Vermont, whose statute was followed in Missouri, the
courts had reached a similar conclusion. 119
It was obvious, however, that the spirit and purposes of the
statute was in this manner defeated. The contract or transac-
tion with the deceased was being employed as the basis of, or as
a defense to the cause of action which the court was called upon
to determine. 120 In Chapman v. Dougherty,121 therefore, the doc-
trine of the Bradley case was overruled, and the court set up a
more equitable rule, to wit
* * * the disability imposed by the statute upon a witness
who is one of the original parties to a contract or cause of
action in issue and on trial, where the other party thereto is
dead, is coextensive with every occasion where such instru-
ment or cause of action may be called into question122
In this manner, the mutuality of producing testimony, and the
prevention of perjury by an interested witness as to facts pecu-
liarly within his knowledge was more effectively accomplished.
The statute, however, is designed and limited to protect the
estate of the deceased party to the contract or cause of action
118. Id. at 72.
119. Manufacturer's Bank v. Scofield (1867) 39 Vt. 590, cited in Gunn
v. Thruston (1895) 30 Mo. 339, 32 S. W. 654, 654.
120. See Linhard v. Ditmars (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 401; Lieber v.
Lieber (1911) 239 Mo. 1, 143 S. W. 458; Bishop v. Brittain Inv. Co. (1910)
229 Mo. 699, 129 S. W. 668, 675, where the rule of Bradley v. West is dis-
cussed and criticized.
121. (1885) 87 Mo. 617. Action in ejectment. The plaintiff relied upon
a deed of the deceased from the defendant. Held, the defendant was in-
competent to testify to the non-delivery of the deed to the deceased.
122. Id. at 626 (italics supplied).
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in issue and on trial, or those who are claiming under him.
Therefore, the creditors or others who would benefit if the sur-
vivor were not permitted to testify, may not prevent a waiver
of the survivor's incompetency by the parties possessing the
right to invoke the statute.1 23
If the contract or transaction with the deceased is not relied
upon by the party to secure any advantage in the suit, it is not
in issue and on trial.124 Thus if a plaintiff's claim or defense is
independent of any dealings with a decedent, the plaintiff is
competent to testify to such facts. 1 25 Or, if the contract or cause
of action between the plaintiff and the deceased is admitted, 20
or is irrelevant to the final determination of the issues in the
suit,' 27 then the contract or cause of action between the survivor
and the deceased is not in issue and on trial, and there may be
testimony as to such facts.
WITNESSES NOT PARTIES TO THE RECORD
In Looker v. DaviS128 it was held that to render a witness in-
competent he must not only be a party to the original contract
in issue and on trial, but also a party to the record in the suit.
At the time that decision was rendered the proviso of the statute
read
Provided, that in actions where one of the original parties
to the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial is
dead, or is shown to the court to be insane, the other party
shall not be admitted to testify in his own favor * * **120
The "other party" not being described, it was possible to say
that it meant either the other party to the proceeding, or the
other party to the contract, who was also a party to the pro-
ceeding. In the Looker case, the latter conclusion was reached.
In Meier v. Thieman,130 however, "the other party" was held not
123. Lampe v. Franklin Amer. Trust Co. (Mo. 1936) 96 S. W. (2d) 710.
124. Infra, notes 125, 126, 127 and 244; Stratton v. Cole (1919) 203 Mo.
App. 257, 216 S. W. 976; Bajohr v. Bajohr (Mo. App. 1916) 184 S. W. 76;
McKee v. Downing (1909) 224 Mo. 115, 124 S. W. 7, 15; Griffin v. Nicholas
(1909) 224 Mo. 275, 123 S. W. 1063.
125. Spence v. Spence (1911) 238 Mo. 71, 141 S. W. 898 (party relied
on adverse possession as the basis of his title rather than upon the deed
from the deceased).
126. Collard v. Burch (1909) 138 Mo. App. 94, 119 S. W. 1009, 1009
(contract was not here admitted, but the court briefly discusses this rule).
127. Supra, note 124; Timmonds v. Wilbur (1924) 209 Mo. App. 54, 260
S. W. 1004, 1007; Stam v. Smith (1904) 183 Mo. 464, 81 S. W. 1217.
128. (1870) 47 Mo. 140; accord Klostermann v. Loos (1874) 58 Mo. 290,
294.
129. R. S. Mo.- (1879) sec. 4010 (italics supplied).
130. (1886) 90 Mo. 433.
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to refer to the other party to the suit, but merely to the other
original party to the contract in issue and on trial. In order to
be incompetent, therefore, it was inessential that the witness also
be a party to the suit.
This proviso was amended in 1887"', to read, "the other party
to such contract or cause of action," thus naming and identify-
ing "the other party," and resolving the uncertainty. The im-
portant determination now is whether the witness comes within
the disqualifications imposed by the statute. If he does, the fact
that he is not also a party to the record will not affect his in-
competency to testify.1 '
The second proviso of the statute, however, still reads "the
other party." In view of the language in the first proviso this
has been construed to mean "the other party to the contract or
cause of action in issue and on trial.' 1 33
PARTY DERIVING TITLE OR INTEREST FROM DECEASED
A party succeeding to the rights of the deceased in a contract
or cause of action is not incompetent to testify thereto.3 4 The
basis for this competency is clearly stated in Norvell v. Cooper"5
In this case the only one of the original parties to the con-
tract or cause of action in issue, who is dead, is defendant's
intestate. The other party is the plaintiff. She is the only
one 'who is, or if living would be subject to the foregoing
disqualification.' If there was any party to the suit whose
right of action or defense was derived from her, the proviso
would render such party incompetent to testify in his own
favor; but there is no such party. The children derive from
deceased, and not from plaintiff, or from any one else who
is, or if living, would be, 'subject to the foregoing disquali-
cation.' Plaintiff being alive, deceased, if living, would not
be disqualified, so the language of the statute would not dis-
qualify her devisees.
The survivor to such contract or transaction with the deceased,
however, is incompetent to deny, rebut, explain, or qualify the
testimony given by these interested parties concerning his con-
131. Laws of 1887, p. 287.
132. Dull v. Johnson (Mo. App. 1937) 106 S. W. (2d) 504, 507; Stone v.
Fry (1915) 191 Mo. App. 607, 178 S. W. 289; McClure v. Clements (1912)
161 Mo. App. 23, 143 S. W. 82.
133. Atkinson v. Hardy (1902) 128 Mo. App. 349, 107 S. W. 466, 467.
134. Poague v. Mallory (1921) 208 Mo. App. 395, 235 S. W. 491, 495.
The contract or cause of action is between A and B. If A or B dies, the
party claiming under the deceased may testify to the contract or cause of
action, whereas the survivor is incompetent to testify thereto; Cole v.
Waters (1912) 164 Mo. App. 567, 147 S. W. 552.
135. (1911) 155 Mo. App. 445, 134 S. W. 1095, 1096.
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tract or transaction with the deceased, since he is expressly dis-
qualified by the statute. 36 The advantage thus afforded to the
estate of the deceased is tremendous, and is strongly contrary to
the intention of the statute. This conclusion is merely indicative
of the peculiar results that a rule of construction may bring
about. The need for revision of the statute in this respect has
been long recognized by our courts.13'
EXTENT OF DISQUALIFICATION
A. Under The First Proviso
The first proviso of the statute does not disqualify the surviv-
ing party for all purposes, but only from testifying to the con-
tract or cause of action in issue and on trial.18 This result is
fair to both parties to the suit, since the competent evidence is
not of such a nature as to be particularly subject to denial or
explanation by the deceased, if living, and, therefore, there is no
practical basis for excluding it.
When a contract or transaction is between a witness who is
living and the survivor, but relates to the contract or cause of
action with the deceased, the survivor is competent to testify
concerning such contract or transaction with the living witness
if the latter presents his version thereof. 39 Theoretically, the
survivor does not testify concerning his transaction with the
deceased, but merely testifies to what occurred between a living
witness and himself. Actually, however, his incompetency to
testify concerning the contract or cause of action with the de-
ceased is thus waived to the extent that the subsequent contract
or transaction with the living witness relates to the one in issue
and on trial. This conclusion seems desirable, since there exists
no legitimate reason for allowing a living witness, who is gener-
ally interested in the event, to testify to alleged damaging ad-
missions by the survivor made subsequent to the contract or
cause of action with the deceased, and to which the latter was
not a party, without affording the survivor an opportunity of
136. Supra, notes 134 and 135.
137. Ibid.
138. Elsea v. Smith (1918) 273 Mo. 396, 202 S. W. 1071, 1073. It is
very difficult often to determine whether or not the offered evidence relates
to the contract or cause of action with the deceased. Bichenbach v. Ellerbe
(1893) 115 Mo. 588 (party held competent to testify that he sent notice to
the deceased); Bank of St. Charles v. Payne (1892) 111 Mo. 29, 20 S. W.
41 (party competent to testify to knowledge derived from sight).
139. Weiermueller v. Scullin (1907) 203 Mo. 466, 101 S. V. 1088, 1090;
Eyermann v. Piron (1899) 151 Mo. 107, 52 S. W. 229; Martin v. Jones
(1875) 59 Mo. 181, 187.
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rebuttal or explanation as to what actually happened, or was
said at such time. 40
When, however, witnesses who were present at the contract
or transaction between the deceased and the survivor, testify
thereto in behalf of the former's representatives or estate, the
survivor is not thereby rendered competent to give his version
of the contract or transaction with the deceased. 14 1 It is sub-
mitted, that if the deceased's side is thus heard, the survivor
should, in all fairness, be given an opportunity to testify to the
same extent. This result would be possible if the court considers
the introduction of such evidence as a waiver of the disqualifica-
tion.
B. Under The Second Proviso
Where an executor or administrator is the other party to the
suit, a much harsher rule applies. The second proviso of the
statute has been construed to disqualify the survivor on the death
of the other party to the contract in issue and on trial from
testifying to any facts which had occurred prior to the appoint-
ment of the executor, or grant of letters of administration, re-
gardless of the nature of the evidence offered.14 2 This rule is not
affected by the fact that the offered evidence relates to an inde-
pendent contract or transaction which took place with third part-
ies subsequent to the death of the other party to the contract in
issue and on trial, or that it did not even relate to the contract
in issue and on trial.1 43 This arbitrary advantage given to the
estate of the deceased has been severely criticized by our courts
for more than fifty years, 4 4 but nothing has been done to alleviate
the situation. The following statement is typical
Speaking for myself, it is difficult to see the reason for
this strict rule. What difference does it make whether the
conversation was before or after the grant of letters of
administration? The dead man is no party to the conversa-
tions. All the persons engaged in the conversation are living.
Some of them are permitted to testify to the conversations,
but the living party to the suit is excluded because the op-
140. Ibid.
141. In re Fossen (Mo. App. 1929) 13 S. W. (2d) 1076; Brunk v. Met.
St. Ry. Co. (1918) 198 Mo. App. 243, 200 S. W. 443, 444.
142. Weiermueller v. Scullin (1907) 203 Mo. 466, 101 S. W. 1088;
Leeper v. Taylor (1892) 111 Mo. 312, 19 S. W. 955. The witness may testify
to facts occurring subsequent to the grant of letters of administration.
Wade v. Hardy (1882) 75 Mo. 394.
143. Hildreth v. Hudloe (Mo. App. 1926) 282 S. W. 747, 748; Poague v.
Mallory (1921) 208 Mo. App. 395, 235 S. W. 491.
144. Supra, notes 142 and 143.
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posing party to the suit is dead. If he had been living, and
was not present at the conversation, he would not be able to
say anything about it. It strikes me, as to these conversa-
tions, separate and independent from any transaction with
the deceased, to permit the living witnesses to give their
version of the conversation, and then exclude the living
party from giving his, is directly in conflict with the spirit
of the statute, of placing all parties on an equal footing. The
party to the suit must remain silent, and living witnesses
can testify that he made certain statements, and he is not
permitted even to deny their statements.145
INDIRECT PROOF OF CONTRACT OR CAUSE OF ACTION
PROHIBITED
A disqualified witness may not prove by indirection through
his own testimony that which the statute will not permit him to
testify to directly. 46 If the extraneous evidence creates the nat-
ural inference of the contract or cause of action, or if its sole
relevancy lies in its tendency to disclose such facts, it is inad-
missible.147 Whether the offered evidence has this effect will de-
pend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
PROPER METHOD OF OBJECTING TO INCOMPETENCY
A failure to object properly to the incompetency of a witness
constitutes a waiver of such right. 48 Since the witness is not
totally incompetent, a general objection to the introduction of
any testimony by him will not be sustained, unless the examina-
tion discloses a purpose to violate the rule as to the disqualifica-
tion.149 A proper objection, therefore, must be specific, and the
attention of the court must be called to the exact reason why such
witness should not be allowed to testify.150 The competency of
the witness, when properly objected to, is placed in issue, and the
court then hears the evidence of both parties relating to such
competency and makes its ruling thereon. 1''
It must be remembered that the testimony is not inadmissible,
but that it is the particular witness who is disqualified from
145. Kersey v. O'Day (1903) 173 Mo. 560, 73 S. W. 481, 484.
146. Dean v. Bigelow (Mo. 1927) 292 S. W. 25; Scott v. Scott (Mo. App.
1924) 265 S. W. 864, 865; Collard v. Burch (1909) 138 Mo. App. 94, 119
S. W. 1009, 1010.
147. Supra, note 146; Comment (1908) 8 Col. L. Rev. 650, 651.
148. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., sec. 421; infra, notes 149-152.
149. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Bennett (1926) 222 Mo. App. 36, 281 S. W.
75, 77; Dempsey v. McGinnis (Mo. App. 1923) 249 S. W. 662, 665.
150. Kneuven v. Berliner's Estate (Mo. App. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d) 494,
500; Barley v. Kansas City (1905) 189 Mo. 503, 87 S. W. 1182.
151. 1 Greenleaf, op. cit., secs. 421, 422 and 423.
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testifying thereto. An objection to the introduction of the testi-
mony, rather than to the right of the witness to testify, is, there-
fore, improper, and will be overruled1. 2
WAIVER OF INCOMPETENCY
A study of the complicated situations giving rise to a waiver
of the incompetency of a witness to testify convinces one that
the "Dead Man's Statute" has become, in this respect, the trap
of the unwary, and the servant of the wise. The simplest mode
of waiver is by allowing the surviving party to take the stand
and to testify without objection.1 53 An administrator or executor
will often expressly waive the incompetency of those filing claims
against the estate, and allow them to testify in their own behalf.
This action is generally founded on the belief that the claimants
have honest demands and will not present unjust claims.
A direct or cross-examination of the survivor concerning the
contract or cause of action with the deceased is a complete waiver
of his incompetency. Having had the benefit of such testimony,
the party cannot afterwards object to his incompetency."5 A
mere perfunctory and irrelevant inquiry does not constitute a
waiver. 55 Nor is a waiver created by a cross-examination of the
survivor which is limited to the testimony introduced on direct
examination over an objection. 56 When the incompetency of a
witness is challenged from the beginning, and the cross-examina-
tion is asserted to be "under protest," but extends to matters not
covered in the examination in chief, there is authority for the
proposition that this excursion does'57 and does not358 constitute
a waiver. Treating such a cross-examination as a waiver places
152. People's Bank of Queen City v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1931)
225 Mo. App. 1113, 40 S. W. (2d) 535; In re Menamy's Guardianship (1925)
307 Mo. 98, 270 S. W. 662.
153. People's Bank of Queen City v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1931)
225 Mo. App. 1113, 40 S. W. (2d) 535; Nordquist v. Nordquist (1929) 321
Mo. 1244, 14 S. W. (2d) 583; Belch v. Roberts (1915) 191 Mo. App. 243,
177 S. W. 1062.
154. Hattersley Brokerage & Comm. Co. v. Hume (1916) 193 Mo. App.
120, 182 S. W. 93; Conrey v. Pratt (1913) 248 Mo. 576, 154 S. W. 749;
Rauch v. Metz (Mo. 1919) 212 S. W. 353.
155. Thomas v. Fitzgeralds' Estate (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 425;
Weffert v. Lawson (1926) 315 Mo. 1099, 287 S. W. 610, 613.
156. Johnston v. Johnston (1903) 173 Mo. 91, 73 S. W. 202, 211.
157. Reitz v. O'Neil (Mo. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 178; Pierce Loan Co.
v. Killian (1910) 153 Mo. App. 106, 132 S. W. 280, 283.
158. In Lohnes v. Baker (1911) 156 Mo. App. 397, 137 S. W. 282, 284,
the witness was incompetent and objected to, but was permitted to testify.
The court said, "Objection was not lost because the cross-examination elicited
all of the damaging evidence;" accord Bowlen v. Baker (1922) 147 Tenn.
36, 245 S. W. 416.
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the objector in a dilemma. If he cross-examines the witness as
to new matters, he waives his incompetency; if he fails to elicit
this less favorable testimony and stands on his objection, and the
witness is eventually declared competent, he has sacrificed valu-
able evidence.
The adverse party may waive the incompetency of a survivor
by taking his deposition., This is true whether the same is filed
in court or not.160 Whether the same rule applies when there
is a stipulation reserving the right to invoke objections to the
"competency, relevancy, and immateriality of the evidence" has
been more difficult of determination.' r ' Such a stipulation has
been held not to prevent a waiver for the following reasons: first,
that the personal disqualification of a witness is not raised by
such a general objection; and, second, that the reservation of
the right to object has been limited to the incompetency of the
testimony of the witness, which is clearly competent, and not
to the incompetency of the witness, who is incompetent.1 2 A
carefully drawn stipulation reserving the right to object to the
incompetency of the witness, and stating the exact basis of his
incompetency, would, it seems, protect the party from waiving
the survivor's incompetency by the taking of his deposition.
When the testimony of the deceased has been preserved and
through it he may be heard, the disqualifying rule does not ob-
tain to the extent of such recorded testimony. 0 3 This is true
whether such testimony is preserved in a bill of exceptions of a
former trial, a letter, or a deposition.0 4 The fact that the counsel
for the deceased refuses to put this testimony in evidence does
not affect the waiver.65 With these cases as a guide, a diligent
lawyer, it seems, could take the depositions of the opposing party
in conformity with the statutory provisions relating to the per-
petuation of testimony, and thus circumvent the effect of the
159. In re McMennamy's Guardianship (1925) 307 Mo. 98, 270 S. W.
662; Alexander v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of The World (1916) 193
Mo. App. 411, 186 S. W. 2, 3; Rice v. Wadill (1902) 168 Mo. 99, 67 S. W.
605.
160. Ibid.; Bush v. Block (1916) 193 Mo. App. 704, 187 S. W. 153.
161. In re Imbodens' Estate (1905) 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S. W. 265; In
re Estate of Soulard (1897) 141 Mo. 642, 43 S. W. 617.
162. Ibid.
163. Knickerbocker v. Athletic Tea Co. (Mo. App. 1926) 285 S. W. 797;
Galvin v. Knights of Father Mathew (1913) 169 Mo. App. 496, 155 S. W.
45, 51.
164. Ibid.; Ferry v. Woody (1922) 210 Mo. App. 98, 241 S. W. 78; Alex-
ander v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of The World (1916) 193 Mo. App.
411, 186 S. W. 2; McCracken v. Schuster (Mo. App. 1915) 79 S. W. 757,
759; Stone v. Hunt (1893) 114 Mo. 66, 21 S. W. 454, 455.
165. Supra, notes 163 and 164.
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statute should death intervene prior to the bringing of the suit.
When the survivor testifies to facts contained in the bill of ex-
ceptions of a former trial at which the deceased was present and
was heard, such survivor may present a contrary version to his
testimony therein, but such evidence is subject to impeachment
by showing its contradictory nature.166 An earlier case had ruled
out any subsequent testimony which did not accord with that pre-
sented at the former trial.167a
In an action to discover assets claimed to be withheld from an
estate, the Missouri statute provides
If the party so cited does not admit the allegations in the
affidavit; he shall be examined under oath, after which, at
the instance of the administrator or executor, other wit-
nesses may be examined both for and against such party;
but, before such other witnesses shall be examined, inter-
rogatories shall be filed in writing, to be examined also in
writing by the parties cited.3 b
In In re Trautmann's Estate68 the Supreme Court held that
the executor waived the incompetency of the survivor by orally
examining him concerning the transaction between the survivor
and the deceased, prior to the filing of the written interrogations.
Although the statute states that the executor shall so act, the
court, after considering the historical background, held that the
oral preliminary examination is not mandatory, but is merely
auxiliary to the main proceeding. The person who initiates the
proceeding may demand it or not as he elects. A practical reason
was also advanced to sustain the conclusion
If the plaintiff in such cases could require the defendant
to disclose under oath all the facts and circumstances touch-
ing the transaction giving rise to the controversy, and then
silence him, he would not have to be a strategist of any great
skill to be able to so frame his pleadings (the interroga-
tories) and to so marshal the evidence as to put the de-
fendant at a serious disadvantage. 19
The filing of the interrogatories, however, has consistently
been held not to act as a waiver of the incompetency of the per-
son answering them.170 These interrogatories are considered as
166. Stone v. Hunt (1893) 114 Mo. 66, 21 S. W. 454.
167a. Coughlin v. Haeussler, Ex'r of Dillon (1872) 50 Mo. 126.
167b. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 64.
168. (1923) 300 Mo. 314, 254 S. W. 286; accord Morley v. Prendiville
(1927) 316 Mo. 1094, 295 S. W. 563.
169. Id. at 289.
170. Carmody v. Carmody (1916) 266 Mo. 566, 181 S. W. 1148; Tygard
v. Falor (1901) 113 Mo. 234, 63 S. W. 672.
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the pleadings in the case, and as constituting a mandatory pro-
cedural step by the plaintiff. It is only too obvious that the
plaintiff is thus afforded the advantage of forcing the survivor
to relate prejudicial portions of the contract or transaction with
the deceased without giving such survivor an opportunity to ex-
plain or present the rest of the facts. The dicta and analogies
advanced by the court in the Trautmann case strongly indicate
that a contrary conclusion should be reached in this situation.
The waiver of the incompetency of one co-defendant by the
plaintiff constitutes a waiver of the right to object to the other
co-defendant's incompetency.17' Also, a waiver by one co-de-
fendant of the plaintiff's incompetency is binding upon the other
co-defendant, unless the latter refuses to take part in the former's
waiver, is not benefited by such evidence, and has no power to
control his co-defendant's action.17 2
A waiver by any of the above specified modes in the Probate
or Justice of the Peace Court continues as a waiver on appeal to
the Circuit Court in a trial de novo. 73 If, however, the repre-
sentative of the deceased had not participated in any way in the
proceeding which resulted in the allowance of the demand in the
Probate Court, although the survivor was there allowed to tes-
tify, the latter will be incompetent, upon proper objection, in
the Circuit CourtY.7 4
In order to render a party competent where there has been a
waiver, it devolves upon his counsel specifically and clearly to
point out this waiver to the court. Otherwise an objection to the
witness's testifying will be sustainedY.15
CO-PLAINTIFFS--CO-DEFENDANTS
In a suit against co-defendants by the representative of the
deceased, upon a joint contract or obligation, neither defendant
is competent to testify concerning the contract or transaction in
his own or in his co-defendant's favor. 7 1 The "other party" to
the contract or cause of action, in other words, consists of all
parties jointly interested in the contract or cause of action with
the deceasedY1 .Co-plaintiffs possessing a joint or mutual inter-
171. Fowler v. Sone (Mo. App. 1920) 226 S. W. 995.
172. Holhnan v. Lange (Mo. 1898) 44 S. W. 752.
173. In re McMennamy's Guardianship (1925) 307 Mo. 98, 270 S. W. 662.
174. Lang v. Wishart (1925) 217 Mo. App. 119, 273 S. W. 768.
175. Norton v. Lynds (Mo. App. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 183; Tomlinson
v. Ellison (1891) 104 Mo. 105, 16 S. W. 201, 203.
176. Short v. Thomas (1914) 178 Mo. App. 400, 163 S. W. 252; Rice v.
McFarland (1890) 41 Mo. App. 489; Hisaw v. Sigler (1878) 68 Mo. 449.
177. Ibid.
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est in the claim cannot testify in their own on their co-plaintiff's
behalf concerning the contract or transaction with the deceased. 7 8
If the contract sued upon, however, was made on the one side
by two persons, one of whom had since died, that fact alone does
not disqualify the survivor from testifying in the case. If the
remaining adverse party is cognizant of the facts which the
survivor desires to testify to, the reason for the statutory inhibi-
tion does not exist, and such survivor is allowed to so testify.179
But if it appears that the contract or transaction upon which the
suit is founded was effected solely through the deceased adverse
party, the survivor is disqualified as a witness, although a re-
maining adverse party to the contract in issue and on trial is
alive. 80 These results seem to be very practical, since the pre-
cautions desired by the statute are thus obtained.
It is doubtful, however, if the statute as it reads justifies these
conclusions. The first proviso is as follows
* * * if one of the original parties to a contract or cause of
action in issue and on trial is dead, * * * the other party
to such contract or cause of action shall not be admitted to
testify in his own favor.
The death of one of the original parties to the contract, as we
saw, does not necessarily disqualify the survivor.,8 ' On the other
hand, the second proviso reads
Where an executor or administrator is a party, the other
party shall not be admitted to testify in his own favor, un-
less the contract in issue was originally made wit& a person
who is living and competent.
In this type of case, it would seem that the survivor should be
permitted to testify concerning the contract whether the remain-
ing adverse party is cognizant of the facts or not, since the lack
of such knowledge does not destroy the fact that the remaining
adverse party is a living party to the contract and competent.
Logic, however, is not the paramount feature of the "Dead Man's
Statute."
There is no cause of action in issue and on trial between a
defendant and his co-defendant when they are both sued by plain-
tiff as joint tort-feasors, and a defendant may, therefore, testify
against his co-defendant, although the latter is deceased. 82
178. Rice v. Shipley (1900) 159 Mo. 39, 60 S. W. 740.
179. Birdsall v. Coon (1911) 157 Mo. App. 439, 139 S. W. 243; Vander-
grif v. Swinney (1900) 158 Mo. 527, 59 S. W. 71; Fulkerson v. Thornton
(1878) 68 Mo. 468, 469.
180. Ibid.; Butts v. Phelps (1883) 79 Mo. 302.
181. Supra, note 179.
182. Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, 396.
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PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING THE "DEAD MAN'S STATUTE"
A. Introduction
The analytical aspects of the "Dead Man's Statute," which
have been heretofore discussed, are to be found in all types of
proceedings. The proper approach to a sound understanding of
the statute, therefore, would be to analyze the essential nature
of these various rules, rather than to rely too heavily upon cases
which are alike as regards the relief demanded, but utterly dis-
similar in the basic problem involved. There is, however, a defi-
nite advantage in a functional approach and in understanding
some of the results our courts have reached in certain like pro-
ceedings which have arisen under the statute.
B. In General
Some of the earlier decisions held that the statute is inap-
plicable to non-contractual causes of action.18 3 This conclusion
has since been definitely overruled, except under the second
proviso which is expressly limited to actions in contract.184 If
the other requirements are satisfied, the first proviso of the stat-
ute applies whether the cause of action is ex delicto, or ex con-
tractu.
When one party to the contract or cause of action in issue and
on trial is dead, the survivor may not be permitted to testify that
the deceased assigned a policy of insurance to him.; 18 that a
partnership 8 or agency'8 7 existed between them; that a mort-
gage given to the deceased was to be a second deed of trust; 8
that he gave certain instructions to the deceased ;180 that he pos-
sessed a power of attorney from the deceased ;1o0 that he per-
formed part of the contract in issue and on trial;191 that he ac-
183. Graham v. Wilson (Mo. App. 1913) 153 S. W. 83, 85 and cases cited.
184. Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, 396-
397.
185. Borchers v. Barckers (1911) 58 Mo. App. 267, 138 S. W. 555, 556;
Saetelle v. Life Ins. Co. (1899) 81 Mo. App. 509.
186. Scott v. Scott (Mo. App. 1924) 265 S. W. 864.
187. Linhard v. Ditmars (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 401.
188. Bank of Williamstown v. Hiller (Mo. App. 1924) 266 S. W. 1031.
189. Collins v. Star Paper Mill Co. (1910) 143 Mo. App. 333, 127 S. W.
641; cf. Wilson v. Frankel (Mo. App. 1933) 61 S. W. (2d) 363, in which
the status of the plaintiff while on the premises was in issue, and the plain-
tiff was permitted to testify that the deceased had given her permission to
use said premises, thus establishing her status thereon as a licensee rather
than as a trespasser.
190. Miller v. Corpman (1923) 301 Mo. 589, 257 S. W. 428.
191. Emmel v. Hayes (1890) 102 Mo. 186, 14 S. W. 209; Sitton v. Shipp(1877) 65 Mo. 297.
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counted to the deceased for certain money being sued for ;192 or,
that he received a gift inter vivos or causa mortis from the de-
ceased.198
C. Parties To Bills And Notes
In proceedings involving bills and notes, the maker, on the
death of the payee, is not permitted to testify to the nature or
failure of the consideration,19 4 to a release, 95 or to his pay-
ment 96 of the note. The death of the maker bars the payee in a
suit for services to deny that the check marked "in full" for such
services, was not so intended by the parties.297 In a suit by an
indorsee of the deceased payee against the maker, a witness, al-
though not a party to the suit, may not testify that the note is
his property by virtue of a contract with the deceased payee. 198
Nor is a maker competent to testify that the deceased indorsee
admitted purchasing the note after maturity, in order to destroy
the indorsee's status as a holder in due course. 9 9 Where the
statute of limitations is pleaded to an action by the payee on the
note, the latter, on the death of the maker, is incompetent to
testify that the maker made certain payments on the note, in
order to defeat this defense.2 0
The results reached in the foregoing proceedings are not diffi-
cult to understand since they involve little more than a direct
application of the letter of the statute.
D. Contract For The Benefit Of A Third Party
In situations where a contract has been entered into for the
benefit of a third party, some perplexing problems arise in ap-
plying the statute. A contract with a parent for the adoption
of her minor child has been construed by our courts to be a con-
tract for the benefit of the child.201 The negotiator of the con-
tract, who is not liable thereon, is competent to testify on the
192. Barnett v. Kemp (1914) 258 Mo. 139, 167 S. W. 546.
193. Suiter v. Frazer (Mo. App. 1920) 226 S. W. 622; Scott v. Riley
(1892) 49 Mo. App. 251.
194. Dull v. Johnson (Mo. App. 1937) 106 S. W. (2d) 504; Hathaway v.
McBride (Mo. App. 1917) 198 S. W. 1143.
195. Ibid.; Davis v. Robb (Mo. App. 1928) 10 S. W. (2d) 680; Powell v.
Bosard (1899) 79 Mo. App. 627.
196. Dull v. Johnson (Mo. App. 1937) 106 S. W. (2d) 504; supra, notes
194 and 195.
197. Dean v. Bigelow (Mo. 1927) 292 S. W. 25.
198. Cleaveland v. Coulson (1903) 99 Mo. App. 468, 73 S. W. 1105.
199. Jones v. Burden (1893) 56 Mo. App. 199.
200. Goddard v. Williamson's Adm'r (1880) 72 Mo. 131.
201. Taylor v. Coberly (1931) 327 Mo. 940, 38 S. W. (2d) 1055; Signaigo
v. Signaigo (Mo. 1918) 205 S. W. 23.
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death of the other party to the contract in an action brought by
the beneficiary, because such a witness, although interested in
the suit from the standpoint of the personal motives he had when
he contracted in behalf of the beneficiary, or which he now has
in desiring the beneficiary to succeed in the present suit, is not
interested in the event according to the common-law criterion of
interest; and, therefore, since he was competent at common law,
he remains competent under the statute, which is now construed
to be an enabling one.202 Earlier cases, holding this to be a dis-
abling enactment, disqualified such a witness, solely upon the
basis that the other party to the contract in issue and on trial
was dead.20 3 When such a negotiator brings the suit on behalf
of the beneficiary, as "trustee of an express trust," there exists
the possibility that he will be liable for costs. This interest is of
a disqualifying nature, and since he is both interested in the
event, and the survivor to the contract in issue and in trial, he is
incompetent to testify thereto.214
The beneficiary is clearly interested in the event, but he is not
a party to the contract because he is not the negotiator thereof.
He is, however, incompetent to testify to the contract on the
death of the negotiator liable thereon, on the basis that he is the
other party to the cause of action in issue anJ on trial.2
But we regard the plaintiffs, if not in reality parties to the
contract, are certainly parties to the "cause of action." The
contract, as we have stated it, was of such a nature as to
give them the cause of action, and they became parties to it
when they accepted its provisions.20 6
This result is in harmony with the definition of "cause of action"
as followed in the Berberich case, namely, the "right of action"
or the legal right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce against the
defendant. 207
When the negotiator who is liable upon the contract desires
to testify thereto, the following factors should be considered. He
202. Ibid.; O'Neil v. Stratton (C. C. A. 8, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 911, 912;
Atkinson v. Hardy (1908) 128 Mo. App. 349, 107 S. W. 466, 467.
203. Edmonds v. Scharff (1919) 279 Mo. 78, 213 S. W. 823; McMorrow
v. Dowell (1905) 116 Mo. App. 289, 90 S. W. 728; Asbury v. Hicklin (1904)
181 Mo. 658, 81 S. W. 390.
204. Crocker v. New York Trust Co. (1927) 245 N. Y. 17; see notes
61-66, supra, dealing with liability for costs as constituting an interest in
the event.
205. Brown v. Patterson (1909) 224 Mo. 639, 124 S. W. 1, 3; Atkinson v.
Hardy (1908) 128 Mo. App. 349, 107 S. W. 466.
206. Atkinson v. Hardy (1908) 128 Mo. App. 349, 107 S. W. 466, 467.
207. Supra, notes 105, 107 and 109.
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is, of course, interested in the event. He occupies, however, a
dual status. As regards the beneficiary, he is the other party to
the cause of action; as regards the negotiator not liable on the
contract, he is the other party to the contract. On the death of
both the beneficiary and the negotiator not liable on the contract,
there is no doubt of his incompetency. If the negotiator not lia-
ble on the contract is dead, but the beneficiary is alive, on the
basis that the other party to the cause of action, the beneficiary,
is alive, the negotiator who is liable should be competent to tes-
tify in his own behalf. Our courts have held, however, that since
the other party to the contract, the negotiator who is not liable,
is dead, the negotiator who is liable thereon is incompetent, since
he is both interested in the event, and is the surviving party to
the contract in issue and on trial.20 8 Suppose, however, the bene-
ficiary (a party to the cause of action) is dead and the negotiator
not liable (a party to the contract) is alive, and the negotiator
liable (a party to the cause of action and also a party to the
contract) desires to testify concerning the contract in issue and
on trial?209
The competency of the witnesses where an agent negotiated
the contract has been previously dealt with.210 These rules should
not be difficult to apply to a contract negotiated by an agent for
the benefit of a third person.
E. Settlor-Trustee-Beneficiary Relationship
In a deed to a grantee as "trustee," the grantor, on the death
of the grantee, is incompetent to explain the terms of the trust.21'
In a suit by the beneficiary for an accounting of the trust assets,
the trustee may not testify to the rights and duties conferred
208. Fisher v. Fisher (1920) 203 Mo. App. 45, 217 S. W. 845, 850. Suit
by the beneficiary against the trustee for an accounting. The court held
that for the purpose of determining the competency of the parties under
the statute, the trustee and the settlor are the parties to the contract for
the benefit of the beneficiary, and that the death of the settlor disqualified
the trustee from testifying to his duties under the trust. If the court had
followed the reasoning of Atkinson v. Hardy, supra, note 206, the trustee
would have been competent on the basis that the beneficiary, the other party
to the cause of action in issue and on trial was alive.
209. If Fisher v. Fisher, supra, note 208 is followed, the negotiator liable
would be competent, since the other party to the contract is alive, and the
fact that the other party to the cause of action is dead would be disre-
garded. If, however, Atkinson v. Hardy, supra, note 206 is controlling, the
negotiator liable would be incompetent, since the death of one party to the
cause of action in that case disqualified the other party thereto, and the
fact that the parties to the contract are alive was immaterial.
210. Supra, notes 94-103.
211. Sanford v. Van Pelt (1926) 314 Mo. 175, 282 S. W. 1022.
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upon him by the deceased settlor. The trust agreement is con-
sidered as "a contract for the benefit of the beneficiary," and
since the settlor, one party to the contract, is dead, the trustee,
the other party, is incompetent to testify thereto.212 Where the
settlor devised land in trust to be used for the support of A,
remainder to the plaintiff, the trustee may, on the death of A,
testify to the disposition of the trust funds in his hands. This
evidence does not concern the contract or cause of action in issue
and on trial, since the "plaintiff is not claiming under or through
A, but as purchaser from the settlor."213
F. Deat. By Wrongful Act
In an action to recover damages for the death by wrongful act
of a party,214 the "Dead Man's Statute" again presents some very
troublesome problems. The principal difficulty is in determining
who are the parties to the cause of action which is in issue and
on trial. The Supreme Court of Missouri had held with the
majority of courts that the cause of action created by the Wrong-
ful Death Statute was not a new one. It is merely the transmis-
sion to the parties designated by the statute of the cause of action
which the deceased would have had if he had survived his in-
juries. 215 Under this interpretation, the parties to the cause of
action in issue and on trial were first, the deceased, and second,
the party against whom the action was brought.211 In Entwhistle
v. Feigner,217 however, the Supreme Court of Missouri had held
that the cause of action afforded by the Wrongful Death Statute
was a different cause of action from the one the deceased would
have had if alive, since all actions at common law based upon
tort died with the death of either party.218 The statutory party
suing for such death by wrongful act and not the deceased, there-
fore, was held to be the other party to the cause of action in issue
and on trial. 219 In State ex rel. Thomas v. Daus220 the Supreme
Court in banc definitely settled this controversy and affirmed the
doctrine of the Entwhistle case.
212. Fisher v. Fisher (1920) 203 Mo. App. 45, 217 S. W. 845; supra,
note 208.
213. Collins v. Crawford (1908) 214 Mo. 167, 112 S. W. 538, 544.
214. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 3262-3263.
215. Tiffany, Death By Wrongful Act (1904) sec. 192; State ex rel. v.
St. Louis Brewing Ass'n v. Reynolds (Mo. 1920) 226 S. W. 579, 580; Hartis
v. Electric Ry. Co. (1913) 162 N. C. 236, 78 S. E. 164; White v. Maxcy(1877) 64 Mo. 552, 558; Procter v. Ry. (1876) 64 Mo. 112, 120.
216. Ibid.
217. (1875) 60 Mo. 214.
218. Behen v. Transit Co. (1904) 186 Mo. 430, 85 S. W. 346, 350.
219. Supra, note 217.
220. (1926) 314 Mo. 13, 283 S. W. 51.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/9
The very purpose of the Damage Act of 1855 was to give a
cause of action where none existed at common law. It did
not revive a cause of action theretofore belonging to the de-
ceased, but it gave a new cause of action to named parties
bearing a relationship to the deceased. 2 1
The following results would seem to arise from this decision:
(1) the party liable for such death is not incompetent if the
party having the right to bring this action is alive, since both
parties to the cause of action in issue and on trial are in ex-
istence.222 This result seems inequitable and contrary to the pur-
poses of the statute, because in the vast majority of these in-
stances the party bringing the action was neither present at nor
has any knowledge of the accident, while the defendant, who is
interested in the event, and is often the active tort-feasor, is
allowed to present his unqualified version of the manner in which
the accident occurred; (2) the death of the defendant, who is a
party to the cause of action, should disqualify the party suing
under the statute, since the latter is now considered to be the
other party thereto; and (3) the death of the party having the
right to bring the action should disqualify the party liable there-
on.
If a servant is responsible for the wrongful act leading to the
death, the same results regarding the competency of the parties
to the suit to testify would follow, since the party liable for such
acts, and not the servant, under the rule of the Berberich case,
has been held to be the other party to the cause of action in issue
and on trial.223 The competency of the servant to testify in tort
situations has been previously discussed. 224
G. Delivery Of Instruments
The survivor is incompetent to testify to a delivery of an in-
strument by the deceased to him.2 2 5 Without proof of such de-
livery, the instrument is inadmissible in evidence. 228 In Weiland
v. Weyland 27 the executor of the deceased sued the defendant
upon a promissory note. The defendant desired to introduce a
written release proved to have been signed by the deceased, but
221. Id. at 56.
222. This was the direct holding in State ex rel. Thomas v. Daus (1926)
314 Mo. 13, 283 S. W. 51.
223. Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393.
224. Supra, notes 115 and 116.
225. Koger v. Black (Mo. 1920) 220 S. W. 904; Wren v. Sturgeon (Mo.
1916) 184 S. W. 1036; Fink v. Hey (1890) 42 Mo. App. 295.
226. Ibid.; Weiland v. Weyland (1876) 64 Mo. 168.
227. (1876) 64 Mo. 168.
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was not permitted to do so since he had no independent proof of
its delivery to him. This result seems unjust, as well as contrary
to common experience. The possibility that this completed in-
strument had not been delivered to the defendant or that the
latter had procured it by wrongful means from the deceased is,
to say the least, remote. The fact that business-men deal privately
in such matters makes the lack of proof (through third parties)
of delivery, actually, a very common event. This result, however,
is inevitable under the literal mandate of the "Dead Man's
Statute."
H. Proof Of The Signature Of The Deceased
Our courts have not been consistent in determining whether
the survivor may testify to the genuineness of the signature of
the deceased. The earlier decisions refused to permit the sur-
vivor to testify,22 while the later cases, although not expressly
mentioning these prior decisions, have reached a contrary con-
clusion.229 The proper approach to this problem, followed in most
jurisdictions it seems, is to first determine the source of the sur-
vivor's knowledge as to the deceased's handwriting. If the wit-
ness derived such knowledge solely from his observation of the
actual signing his testimony should be inadmissible, since it re-
lates to the transaction with the deceased, which the latter, if
living, could contradict or deny. On the other hand, if the wit-
ness testifies to the genuineness of the signature as an expert,
or from his own knowledge as gained through a course of dealing
with the deceased, such evidence cannot be interpreted as relat-
ing to a transaction with the deceased. It is clearly nothing more
than the opinion of the witness, which the deceased, even if alive,
would not be able to deny.2 30
I. Parties To A Deed-Resulting Or Constructive Trusts
Upon the death of either the grantor or the grantee, the one
surviving, or those claiming under him, cannot testify to any
contract or transaction with the deceased which has reference to
the deed itself, and which tends to destroy, explain, qualify,
modify, or attack the title therein conveyed.231 The following
situations are typical: the grantor, after the death of the grantee,
228. Davis v. Wood (1901) 161 Mo. 17, 61 S. W. 695; Kaho v. King
(1885) 19 Mo. App. 44.
229. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Bennett (Mo. App. 1926) 281 S. W. 75, 77;
Conley v. Johnson (1920) 204 Mo. App. 185, 222 S. W. 897.
230. Comment (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 229, 230; Comment (1908) 8 Col.
L. Rev. 650.
231. Davis v. Wood (1901) 161 Mo. 17, 61 S. W. 695, 697; Danciger v.
Stone (1919) 278 Mo. 19, 210 S. W. 865, 866; infra, notes 232-237.
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cannot testify that the deed was not made to the grantee per-
sonally, but merely as trustee for the grantee's wife ;232 the
grantee cannot show that the consideration in the deed from
deceased grantor is other than that therein expressed ;233 the
grantee is incompetent to testify to a compliance with the condi-
tions of the deed.23 ' If, however, these conditions were "mere
inducements or circumstances leading up to the deed," the grantee
may testify thereto, since he is in no way testifying concerning
the deed itself.23 , Apart from these illustrations, it is held that
the grantor may not testify to a verbal release of the deed which
he executed and delivered to the deceased grantee ;236 and, the
grantee cannot testify to oral admissions of his title by the de-
ceased grantor.2 37
Where one of the parties alleges a title or claim which is inde-
pendent of the deed, he is not incompetent, because the validity
or terms of the deed are not being denied or attacked, and the
deed, therefore, is not in issue and on trial.2 38 Thus, where the
plaintiff had delivered a note to a deceased agent for collection,
and the agent directed the trustee to sell, the agent taking title
in himself and conveying to the defendant, the plaintiff may tes-
tify to such fraudulent manipulations by the deceased agent, since
such testimony is introduced to show the plaintiff's claim to the
property, rather than to attack the deed from-the agent to the
defendant.2 39 Where the plaintiff relies upon adverse possession,
he is permitted to testify to the facts necessary to sustain his
title, although the grantor of the deed upon which the defendant
relies is dead.240 In Stam v. Smitb241 the judgment creditors of
the deceased grantor brought suit to set aside an alleged fraudu-
lent conveyance to the defendant grantee. The grantee was per-
mitted to testify concerning the conveyance to him.
The suit is not upon the contract evidenced by the deed * *
Plaintiff's rights lie wholly dehors that contract-and out-
side the mutual stipulations of the parties to that deed, and
232. Smith v. Smith (1907) 201 Mo. 533, 100 S. W. 579.
233. Edmonds v. Scharff (1919) 279 Mo. 78, 213 S. W. 823; Chapman v.
Dougherty (1885) 87 Mo. 617.
234. Cook v. Higgins (1921) 290 Mo. 402, 235 S. W. 807.
235. Griffin v. Nicholas (1909) 224 Mo. 275, 123 S. W. 1063.
236. Hughes v. Israel (1881) 73 Mo. 538.
237. Sanford v. Van Pelt (1926) 314 Mo. 175, 282 S. W. 1022; Gray v.
Shelton (Mo. 1926) 282 S. W. 53.
238. Golden v. Tyer (1904) 180 Mo. 196, 79 S. W. 143; infra, notes 239-
241 and 244.
239. Dougherty v. Strong (1926) 313 Mo. 35, 281 S. W. 445, 448.
240. Spence v. Spence (1911) 238 Mo. 71, 141 S. W. 898.
241. (1904) 183 Mo. 464, 81 S. W. 1217.
NOTES1938]
Washington University Open Scholarship
380 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23
depends on showing it was made to defeat creditors * * *. In
this controversy, on the one side are the creditors, .and on
the other the grantee in the deed.242
A difficult problem exists in determining the competency of
the parties to a suit where the plaintiff seeks to establish a re-
sulting or constructive trust. In the resulting trust situation, the
death of the grantee has generally been held to disqualify the
plaintiff or his representatives, since the plaintiff relies upon a
contract or agreement with the deceased, which the latter, if he
were living, could explain or contradict.243 In the constructive
trust cases, where the deceased had acted "wrongfully," and with-
out the consent of or under an agreement with the plaintiff, the
latter has generally been held competent to testify that his money
furnished the consideration for the purchase price, because such
testimony relates to an extraneous or independent claim, and not
upon any contract or transaction with the deceased. 244 The earlier
rulings which held that the plaintiff was competent in construc-
tive trust cases on the theory that the statute applied only to
actions founded on contract, and these are actions in tort, 2 4 are
no longer tenable in view of the fact that the statute is now con-
strued to be applicable regardless of the nature of the action,
except under the second proviso which is expressly limited to
contract actions.24 16 The later cases are properly sustainable on
the extraneous or independent claim theory above stated. In both
the resulting and constructive trust situations where the sur-
vivor is the one who acted wrongfully, the heirs or representa-
tives of the deceased are competent to testify to the contract or
transaction between the deceased and the survivor on the basis
already indicated.246b
J. Will Contests
In will contest cases such a wide latitude is permitted in ad-
mitting testimony of conversations, mental capacity, fraud, un-
due influence, directions to scriveners, and other circumstances
concerning the testator's activities that the "Dead Man's Statute"
is seldom applicable. In fact the right to contest the validity of
242. Id. at 1219.
243. Orr v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1922) 291 Mo. 383, 236 S. W.
642; Goodale v. Evans (1914) 263 Mo. 219, 172 S. W. 370.
244. Roberts v. Roberts (Mo. 1927) 291 S. W. 485, 487; Pressy v. Slezah(Mo. 1925) 278 S. W. 382; Miller v. Slupsky (1900) 158 Mo. 643, 59 S. W.
99.
245. Graham v. Wilson (Mo. App. 1913) 153 S. W. 83, 84, and cases
cited.
246a. Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393.
246b. Supra, notes 134-137.
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the will is generally limited to persons whose interests are sub-
stantially affected by the will.24 7 The statutory provisions regard-
ing the incompetency of a subscribing witness who is disqualified
by interest and waiver thereof is well known.248 A detailed
analysis of these situations would require a separate treatment.
K. Doctrine Of Fraud Ex Necessitate Rei
At common law parties to the record or interested in the event
were competent as witnesses, under a clear exception to the gen-
eral rule, where it had been already proved that the party against
whom the evidence was offered "had been guilty of some fraud
or other tortious and unwarrantable act," or "where on general
grounds of public policy, it was deemed essential to the purposes
of justice.' '2 1 Since our statute is now construed to be an enab-
ling one, such witnesses, being competent at common law, should
remain competent under the statute.2 5 0 This doctrine of "fraud
ex necessitate rei," has, however, been seldom urged, 2 1 and ex-
actly how far and to what types of factual situations our court
will apply it is difficult to ascertain. A study of the common-law
history and cases involving this principle will furnish the best
answer to this problem.
L. Miscellaneous
The same rules which have been declared when one party is
dead are applicable when the other party to the contract or cause
of action in issue and on trial is insane.252 Other jurisdictions
have extended their statutes to include "idiots, habitual drunk-
ards, and distorted persons. '253 Still others have restricted the
disqualification to death alone. 254 The liberality or restrictive-
ness of the protection afforded is primarily a question of legisla-
tive policy which should depend upon whether the need exists for
the disqualification, and whether the party's position is an in-
247. Woerner, Law of Decedents' Estates (2nd ed. 1924) sees. 200-202;
Gamache v. Gamache, Adm'r (1873) 52 Mo. 287, 290; Note (1933) 6 Miss.
L. Rev. 409, 413.
248. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 558.
249. 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (14th ed. 1883) sees. 348-350.
250. Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn. (Mo. 1937) 105
S. W. (2d) 941.
251. In Warfield v. Hume (1902) 91 Mo. App. 541, 546, this doctrine was
urged, but the court rejected it on the basis that the facts did not warrant
its application; see Henry v. Sneed (1899) 99 Mo. 407 where the doctrine
was applied to permit the wife to testify concerning confidential communi-
cations to her husband.
252. Martinsburg Bank v. Fennewald (Mo. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 207;
McClure v. Clements (1912) 161 Mo. App. 23, 143 S. W. 82.
253. Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (1935) ch. 51, sec. 2.
254. Kan. Gen. Stat. (1935) ch. 60-2804.
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voluntary one, so that he is equitably entitled to this safeguard.
One rule which is very important but not often invoked is the
right the representatives or those claiming under the deceased
have to force the survivor to testify against himself concerning
the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial. This privi-
lege, where the survivor is honest and upright, is a very mate-
rial and valuable advantage.25
CRITICISM OF THE UNDER-LYING POLICY OF THE STATUTE
Few statutes have ever been as severely criticized by so many
prominent text writers as the "Dead Man's Statutes.126 The New
York Commission in their report interposed this objection to
such statutes257
Who that has any respect for the society in which he lives,
can doubt, that, upon this principle, the witness should be
admitted? The contrary rule implies, that, in the majority
of instances, men are so corrupted by their interest, that
they will perjure themselves for it, and that besides being
corrupt, they will be so adroit, as to deceive court and juries.
This is contrary to all experience. In the great majority of
instances the witnesses are honest, however much inter-
ested, and in most cases of dishonesty the falsehood of the
testimony is detected and deceives none.
Professor Wigmore advances the objection that the exclusion
of such evidence precludes honest claims of the living, and that
there is no more justification "to save dead men's estate from
false claims than to save living men's estate from the loss by
lack of proof.12 8
Another criticism of these statutes is that they do not dis-
qualify certain witnesses who are vitally interested in the out-
come of the suit, but who do not possess an "interest in the
event," whereas they do disqualify certain totally disinterested
witnesses.219 The above-considered situations only too well up-
hold the validity of this charge.
In Freeman v. Berberich, this criticism of our "Dead Man's
Statute" was reiterated 260
However, it is to be feared that absolute equality or oppor-
tunity to produce testimony is a shibboleth impossible of at-
255. Jackson v. Smith (1910) 139 Mo. App. 69, 123 S. W. 1026, 1027.
256. The Law Of Evidence: Some Proposals For Its Change, published
under the auspices of the Commonwealth Fund in 1927.
257. Id. at 25; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923) 1000, see. 576.
258. 1 Wigmore, op. cit., 1005, sec. 578.
259. Supra, notes 61, 74 and 83.
260. (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393, 400.
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tainment. It is like the theoretical condition of evenly bal-
anced testimony sometimes referred to in instructions. Will
not courts more often reach the truth by properly weighing
the evidence which can be produced?
Another objection is that the statute "encumbers the profes-
sion with a profuse mass of quibbles over the interpretation of
words," and that the time consumed in applying and interpreting
the statute is out of all proportion to the doubtful good it does.26'
When one considers the mass of litigation on this subject, the
numerous instances of non-conformity to the purposes of the
statute, the intricate distinctions which have been drawn, the
certainty that the future will bring additional technical prob-
lems which will tend to further complicate an already compli-
cated situation, he strongly hesitates in denying that the statute
should be abolished, or at least materially modified.
LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS OF "DEAD MAN'S STATUTES"
Ten jurisdictions do not have the typical "Dead Man's Statute"
but other provisions have been enacted to solve this problem.2 6
Four states have abandoned the rule altogether, but allow the
admission of the decedent's hearsay declarations as an antidote
to the survivor's testimony.2 3 A questionnaire held in one of
these states revealed that the great majority of the lawyers and
judges were of the opinion that this enactment is very desirable,
and aids greatly in the ascertainment of truth and justice.264
The Virginia and New Mexico enactments admit the testimony
of the survivor, but refuse to allow a verdict in his favor unless
his testimony is corroborated.2 6 5 A similar requirement of sub-
stantiation has been read into the Louisiana statute, which pro-
vides that interest does not make a witness incompetent, but may
"diminish the extent of his credibility. ' 266
The New Hampshire and Montana provisions allow the trial
court discretion to admit the survivor's testimony "when it ap-
pears that * * * injustice will be done without it.' ' 267 The unique
261. Supra, note 256; 1 Wigmore, op. cit., 1006-1007, see. 578.
262. Supra, note 256, 1. c. 28; 1 Wigmore, op. cit., 1007, see. 578; Note
(1933) 6 Miss. L. Rev. 409.
263. Conn. Gem Stat. (1930) sec. 5608; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 233,
sec. 66; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) sec. 9-403; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) sec. 5039.
264. Note (1933) 6 Miss. L. Rev. 409, 411.
265. Va. Code Ann. (1930) sec. 6209; N. Mex. Stat. Ann. (1929) sec.
45-601.
266. La. Civil Code (1932) sec. 2282.
267. N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) ch. 336, secs. 27 and 28; Mont. Rev. Code
(1921) sec. 10535.
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Arizona Statute, which provides that the survivor is incompetent,
"unless * * * required to testify by the court," results in a like
conclusion. 268
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the solution to this problem is not easy. Three
general possibilities suggest themselves: the statute can be com-
pletely abolished and some other form of restriction upon the
admissibility of this type of testimony substituted, possibly one
similar to those existing in the ten jurisdictions which have so
acted; or, the statutory situation can be allowed to remain as
it is, without any effort to change or modify the statute, leaving
the goal of improvement to be attained by judicial construction;
or, it is possible to make a careful survey of the particular de-
fects which have developed in the application of the statute, and
to revise the statute with a purpose to eliminate them.
The last remedy would appear to be the most desirable, be-
cause, although many of the criticisms against the statute have
a measure of validity, yet in general the purposes which this
enactment attempts to effectuate remain worthy of accomplish-
ment. The decisions which fail to reach the aims intended by the
statute, or which have been so troublesome to the bench and bar,
merely illustrate the need for revision and clarification of the
statute, and are not a justification for its complete repeal. The
writer believes that a competent committee, after a careful study
of this problem, could revise this statute so that it would be coml
paratively easy to understand and apply, thereby moulding it
into a truly helpful instrumentality of justice.
M. J. GAnDE.
268. Ariz. Code (1928) sec. 4414.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/9
